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Contracting for Nonpoint-Source
Pollution Abatement
Olof Bystrom and Daniel W. Bromley
This study presents  an  incentive  scheme  to control  agricultural nonpoint-source
pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework  with two parties:
farmers  and  a  regulating  authority.  Our  incentive  scheme  proposes  collective
penalties  as  a  way  to  control  pollution.  Unlike  previous  analyses  of incentive
schemes  to  control  agricultural  pollution,  we  suggest  nonindividual  contracts
between  farmers  and a regulating authority,  where  farmers  can trade  pollution
abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory
agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.
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Introduction
Agricultural nonpoint-source  (NPS) emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus are major
sources of pollution in many watersheds, causing environmental problems such as algal
blooms in rivers, lakes, and in the sea, and may also reduce biodiversity. Abatement of
NPS pollution has received substantial attention, and there are numerous studies that
analyze  policy and cost-effective  solutions  to pollution problems.  An area which has
received less attention is the cost of information. Many studies  have pointed out the
potentially  large  transactions  costs  associated  with NPS pollution  regulation  (e.g.,
Baumol  and  Oates; Loehman  and Dinar;  Stavins).  If information  is unavailable  or
costly, a regulatory agency  may want to use policies  that economize  on information
costs.
The purpose of this investigation is to formulate a model that allows and encourages
cost-effective solutions to NPS pollution problems. We describe and discuss the problem
of agricultural pollution in the context of uncertainty and provide a suggested solution
to an agricultural NPS pollution problem on a national level. A principal-agent frame-
work  is used,  with farmers and  a regulating  authority (government)  as the  parties
involved in the pollution abatement process. The incentive scheme proposed is based on
collective penalties  for farmers.  We show that neither individual contracts with each
farmer, nor full information on the part of the regulatory agency, is necessary to achieve
cost-effective  abatement  of NPS pollution.  The  benefits  of this  result,  in terms  of
lowering transactions  costs, could be substantial.
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Literature on NPS Regulation
Policies for reducing  nonpoint-source  pollution have been  suggested by a number of
authors.  Griffin and Bromley evaluate  economic incentives and standards  applied to
expected runoff or management practices. They show that both incentives and standards
can be defined such that efficient solutions result, regardless of whether the policy is
applied to expected runoff or management practices. Under less restrictive assumptions,
Shortle and Dunn find that when emissions are stochastic, a first-best optimal solution
cannot be achieved. They conclude that appropriately  specified management practice
incentives  generally outperform  other available policies. Using similar assumptions,
Smith and Tomasi report that in the presence of transactions  costs, only second-best
solutions can be achieved by using input taxes.
A large  body  of literature  evaluates  the economic  consequences  of reducing  NPS
emissions  by  changing management  practices  (e.g.,  Braden  et al.;  Chowdhury  and
Lacewell;  Taylor,  Adams,  and Miller;  Walker,  Calkins,  and  Hamilton).  To  regulate
management  practices, the regulating authority needs  substantial information.  The
regulations  allow  farmers  limited  ability  to  use  their  private  information  in
finding  low-cost  abatement  measures.  Thus,  unless  management  practice  policies
are  formulated  under  perfect  information  and  perfect  enforceability,  these  policies
may fail  to  incorporate  many low-cost  abatement measures  that may  be  taken  on
farms.
Incentive  schemes  that allow  a  more flexible  approach  to  agricultural  pollution
problems have been  suggested by Meran  and Schwalbe;  Segerson; and Xepapadeas.
Suggested policies are based on collective rewards and penalties. Under these incentive
schemes, farmers  are  free  to  choose  the method  to reduce  pollution, as long as the
aggregated pollution from a watershed does not exceed a certain level.
We  briefly  summarize  and  discuss  some  of the  properties  of these  approaches,
especially  from  the point  of view  of information  requirements  and  efficiency.  The
general outline of the incentive systems that are proposed by the authors is given in
Holmstrom.  He designs a system, within a principal-agent framework,  that enables
the principal  to obtain  a  first-best  solution  even  though  the actions  of agents  can-
not be observed.  Holmstrom  also  shows that the proposed  system eliminates moral
hazard.
Segerson  presents  an incentive  scheme  that builds  on  collective  payments  with
individual  contracts  for  all polluters.  She  assumes that,  while  the  emissions  from
individual polluters  cannot be measured,  it is possible  to measure  ambient concen-
trations  of the pollutants  from a watershed.  In her suggested incentive  scheme,  an
ambient pollution standard is set. If the aggregate pollution is less than that dictated
by the  ambient standard,  then firms receive  a positive  payment.  If pollution  levels
exceed the standard, each polluter has to pay a fee that is linear in ambient pollution
level, plus  a penalty for exceeding  the ambient pollution level. In the latter case, all
polluters  must pay the penalty, even if they have  undertaken  pollution  abatement
measures. The fact that the system relies on individual contracts, and does not allow for
"pollution  trading"  among  farmers,  makes  the  system  look  more  like  a  system  of
Pigouvian taxes than a "bubble," as was proposed by Segerson.
Meran and Schwalbe show that incentive schemes can be designed based on effluent
taxes or effluent standards even though the effluent emission level cannot be observed.
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They introduce  a truth-telling  mechanism based  on collective penalties  (fines).  The
system is structured on the ambient concentration  of pollutants, where every polluter
is liable if the ambient pollution level is exceeded. The researchers suggest two types of
individually designed contracts where the polluter must pay a fine if the aggregate level
of pollution exceeds  the ambient standard.  The polluter pays nothing if the ambient
pollution standard is not violated. By this incentive scheme, they demonstrate that both
effluent  taxes  and  ambient standards  can  be  used  effectively,  despite the  fact that
effluent levels of pollution are not observable.
Xepapadeas suggests a scheme where contracts are not individual, but each firm pays
the same fine if deviations from the ambient standard are detected. He shows that even
when using nonindividual  contracts,  a cost-effective  reduction  of emissions  can  be
achieved.  While the analysis is presented in a dynamic framework, Xepapadeas  finds
that the conclusions  are equally valid under a static incentive scheme.
The incentive schemes suggested by Segerson, and by Meran and Schwalbe, build on
individual contracting. This means that the regulating authority must design n different
contracts  requiring  unique  information  about  n  different  firms.  This  information
requirement may be unrealistic or costly to obtain. If we include information costs in the
design of incentive schemes for NPS pollution abatement, it is doubtful whether optimal
solutions based  on individual contracts  would  be the least-cost way of abating  NPS
pollution. The complexity of the design may undermine the efficiency gains induced by
optimal  contracting.  This has  also been  pointed  out by Cabe  and Herriges,  and  by
Loehman and Dinar.
An assumption in these studies is that the agents are risk neutral with respect to
income,  implying  that  agents  have  identical  risk  preferences.1 If  contracts  are
individual,  nonhomogeneous  risk preferences  do  not pose  any problems  since  each
contract  can  be  designed  to  reflect  individual  risk  preferences;  thus  an  optimal
allocation  of abatement  is reached.  Xepapadeas  suggests  uniform  contracts  for  all
the polluters.  In this case, a cost-effective  solution may not be achieved if farmers do
not  have  homogeneous  risk  preferences.  Xepapadeas  does  not  allow  for  any  side




In defining policies for NPS water pollution, we have parties acting on two levels. First,
there are farmers who produce goods, but who also affect water quality by their actions.
Second,  there  is  a  regulating  authority  which  has  an  interest  in increasing  and
maintaining environmental quality in the area. We assume that farmers produce output
y,  using  a  vector  of inputs  x.  The input  vector  includes  all relevant  farm-specific
information. Let us also define a variable, a(x), that describes farmers' efforts to reduce
pollution from their farm. Following Segerson, and Meran and Schwalbe, and utilizing
1  This assumption is implicit in Xepapadeas, and in Segerson.
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the envelope theorem, we can write farmer i's production and cost functions as functions
of abatement effort, yi(ai) and ci(ai).2
Stochastic events such as storms and temperature  affect the level of nutrient runoff
from agricultural land. There is an additional uncertainty in that farmers only have a
limited knowledge of how their abatement efforts transfer into water quality improve-
ments. Biophysical factors, such as soil type, slope, and spatial differences among farms,
affect  how a farmer's  abatement  efforts  transfer  into water  quality.  Let these  two
sources of uncertainty be captured in the stochastic variable  6. Assume now that there
is a common perception (more or less correct) among farmers of how abatement efforts
transfer into water quality. We  can then write the stochastic production function for
water quality as e = e(a,  , where a = (a,  ... , a  ... , an) is a vector of all farmers'
efforts in a watershed. Note that in defining e(a, 6), we also assume that a farmer can
observe the abatement efforts of other farmers in the watershed.
The  objective  of the regulatory  agency is  to maximize  welfare.  In order  to control
agricultural pollution, the agency needs an instrument that is feasible and that ensures
low abatement costs  as well as low  costs of information.  Following the assumptions
above, farmers have a common perception of how abatement efforts transfer into water
quality.  We  also assume that farmers  can observe  one another's  abatement  efforts.
Finally, we assume that farmers can obtain this information without cost. It is plausible
that it is difficult,  or associated with high costs, for the regulatory  agency to obtain
farm-specific  information  that  is sufficient  to directly  monitor  farmers'  abatement
efforts and/or emissions.  We therefore  assume that the agency can observe aggregate
output of crops and ambient water quality, but not the abatement efforts by individual
farmers.
In this setting, farmers have an informational advantage over the regulatory agency.
This  asymmetry  of information  motivates  a principal-agent  approach.  In  order  to
maximize welfare,  the authority needs an incentive  scheme that induces  farmers to
improve water quality.  Due to the asymmetry  of information,  it  is  also desirable  to
identify a system of payments that allows farmers to use their private information in
improving water quality. Indeed, a system that corresponds to a regime of "marketable
permits" would take care of potential inefficiencies. The problem, however, is that it is
difficult, or expensive, to trace pollution back to the polluter, and thus there are limited
opportunities  to  control  compliance  with any  direct  regulation  of emissions  at the
individual farm level.
We  propose  an  incentive  scheme  that reduces  the  information  required  by  the
regulating authority. The suggested system rests on collective penalties and an ambient
standard for a watershed. We also allow the farmers to negotiate and trade abatement
efforts  among themselves.  In this  case,  the  role  of the  principal  is to  enforce  the
penalties rather than to directly monitor the actions of farmers. Using contracts that are
not individual allows us to reduce the information requirements for the authority, since
there is only one contract for the whole watershed.  Since our incentive scheme allows
for trade among farmers, the incentive scheme can be regarded as a "virtual" tradeable
2 The optimization  problem that allows us to write the production and cost functions as  functions of a can be stated as:
maxpy(x) - c(x) with respect to x, subject to a constraint in abatement effort, a(x) >  a*. If a(x) is continuous in x, solving this
problem for all levels of a* and applying the envelope  theorem  gives x(a),  and thus yi(xi(a'))  y'(a), and c(x(ai)) =  c(a
i)
(Varian). If x is  a polluting input, it is clear that ax(a)/da < 0. In order for the envelope  problem, max y(a) - c(a), to be
consistent with the standard properties of the profit function, we also require that x(a) is concave, i.e.,  a2x(a)/a
2 < 0.
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permit system. The suggested system is based on the works of Holmstr6m, and Meran
and Schwalbe.  The differences  here are that we propose nonindividual contracts with
the polluters, that we open the possibility for farmers to trade abatement efforts, and
that we apply the methodology  to a nonpoint pollution problem.
Model Development
Assume that emissions from a particular farm cannot be observed. However, the author-
ity can measure  ambient water quality along a river or stream.  Based on measured
ambient water quality, the authority then formulates an incentive scheme according to
the criteria discussed below.
Let T(e) be a per hectare payment scheme that is identical for all farms; let  e * be the
minimum required  ambient water  quality,  and e(a, 6)  the observed  ambient water
quality. T(e) will be zero if ambient water quality is higher than the required  e *, and
strictly positive if the observed water quality is below e *. We can thus write T(e) as:
[Oife  >e*}
(1)  ,  T(e)  l=  113:p  if e  <  e*
where  p > 0,  and p is a per hectare penalty that all farmers  pay when the observed
water quality is below e *. The total amount paid by the farmer is then T(e)Li,  where LV
is the total arable land on farm i. It was noted earlier that water quality is stochastic.
Due to 6, the probability of paying the penalty is therefore never zero, but varies with
farmers' efforts to comply with the standard and with the level of the ambient standard
itself(e*) set by  the  authority.  We  can write  the probability  of paying  the  penalty
as f  *f(e; a) de, that is, the probability that observed water quality will be less than the
required  e *, given farmers' efforts,  a, to comply with the standard.  The probability of
paying the penalty decreases with abatement effort, since effort increases water quality.
This means that fS*fai(e; a) de < O,  where the subscript a' denotes the derivative  with
respect to farm i's efforts.
We also allow a payment among farmers, where they can buy or sell water quality
improvements. Instead of increasing the efforts on their own farms, farmers may choose
to bribe other farmers  and thereby  affect the probability of paying the penalty.  The
payment that a bribing farmer will make to the others is then determined by other
farmers' costs, risk aversion, and current allocation of factors. Let ki(aj) denote the bribe
that farmer i makes to farmerj in order to affectj's abatement effort. Hence, kO(aj) also
denotes farmerj's income from farmer i for changing abatement effort. Further, let kj(ai)
denote the payment that farmer i receives  from farmerj for increasing i's abatement
effort.
Assume that farmers are risk averse and put some value on a certain income. Let V(.)
denote the utility of income, and assume that V(.) is strictly concave in income. Farmers
will maximize expected utility both with respect to their own efforts and with respect
to the efforts of other farmers. There is an interdependence among farmers in that the
probability of paying the penalty is determined through the efforts of all farmers.  To
simplify notation, let WHi denote farmer i's income when the penalty is not paid, and
let WL i denote income if the penalty is levied. We can then define
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WHi =  py(ai)  - c(ai)  - ki(ai) +  k(ai),  Vj t i,
i  J
and WL i =  WHi - PL  i, where  P is the per hectare penalty, and LV  is the amount of land
on farm i. The expected utility-maximization  problem of farmer i can now be formulated
as:3
(2)  max  1  e f(e; a)  de  V(WH ) + fe(e; a) de V(WLi)i,  Vj  i.
aaJ  o  /  J:
Farmers maximize their expected utility and take the levels of penalty and ambient
standard as given. Note that the probability of paying the penalty is affected by the level
of the ambient standard. The first-order conditions for an optimal solution are written
as:
(3)  (  - f(e; a) de V'(WHi) +  f(e; a)deV(WL i)
x(vPai(ai)  Cai(ai)J+  E  k ji(ai)
-ffai(e;  a)de[V(WHi)-V(WLi)]  0,
and
(4)  [(  -e*f(e;  a)de)V'(WHi) +  e f(e;a)  de V(WL  )
x (-kj(aJ)) - f  j  (e;  a)de  [V(WHi) - V(WL i)] =  0.
From the first-order conditions, we derive optimal allocations of abatement effort and
production on each farm (see  also the appendix).  There is a possibility that farmers'
profits  will  be  negative  in  this  case,  depending  on  the  level  of  penalty  and  the
probability of paying the penalty.
Now, how large is the payment ki(aj), and why do we need this payment? Let us begin
with the latter question. Assume that farmers have different attitudes toward risk. A
risk-averse farmer will then undertake more efforts to reduce the probability of paying
the penalty than will  a risk-neutral  farmer.  If farmers  also have  different  resource
endowments, their production possibilities, and thus costs, will vary. The difference in
factor use among farmers  opens the possibility of trade. By trading abatement efforts,
cost-effective pollution abatement can be ensured since rational farmers who maximize
utility will attempt to minimize their costs of abatement effort. Consequently, marginal
costs of effort are equalized  among farms under the proposed  incentive scheme.  (For
proof,  see appendix.)
3Note that under full information, our suggested incentive scheme would simplify to a system of Pigouvian effluent charges
where trade among farmers is not necessary for an efficient outcome. The penalty in that case is determined as a function
of farmers' emissions and the ambient standard.
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Without side payments, farmers act independently and will solve only equation (3).
As  side  payments  are  introduced,  farmers  can  affect  one  another's  abatement  by
paying the other farmers (at least) their marginal costs of effort as given by the other
farmers' first-order  conditions.  Thus, the effect  of the side payment ki(ai) is that we
convert farmers'  private  profit-maximization  problem  into that of joint profit maxi-
mization for all farmers. The bribe is the key to why nonindividual  contracts can be
used.
In order to avoid free riding, we require each farmer's profits to be maximized under
the incentive  scheme. Consequently, we need the expected (dis)utility of the penalty to
be sufficiently high to provide each farmer with private incentives to undertake abate-
ment efforts. If we denote the expected marginal abatement cost by v, then the expected
marginal  utility  of abatement  must  be  at least  as  large  as the  marginal  costs  in
optimum; that is, q 2  v  > 0, where q is the expected marginal utility of abatement. By
changing the penalty,  the regulatory  agency can affect farmers' utility of abatement
efforts, and thus their optimal abatement. Now, if marginal costs are equalized among
farms, such that v 1 = 2 = ...  = vn, then one standard contract, where the penalty is set
such that q  2 vi  > 0 for all i, is obviously sufficient to avoid free riding in the abatement
process.4
With  an incentive  scheme  defined  according  to the  above,  we  have  reduced the
information  requirement  on the regulating authority.  We assume  that farmers hold
information,  not only about their own  profit function, but also about the abatement
efforts of other farmers. However,  each farmer's own information  does not have to be
substantial. A farmer will offer to buy abatement efforts from other farmers as long as
the expected  cost for that service is less than the costs of undertaking abatement on
his/her  own farm.  Other  farmers  will  accept  this  offer  if it  increases  their  profit.
Therefore, by using a uniform contract and allowing for side payments, we can reduce
the information requirement of the authority.
Note  that  in  solving  the  pollution  problem,  we  are  not  dependent  on  farmers'
participation in the program. An incentive  scheme according to our suggestion would
be compulsory for all farms within a watershed.  It is therefore not necessary to have a
participation constraint in the maximization problem above. In this setting, there is no
optimal number of participants in the incentive scheme since the number is given by the
natural borders  of a watershed.  If the threat of a penalty creates negative  profits for
some farmers, they may find ways (new technologies) to make profits nonnegative, they
may go out of business, or they may sell their farm to a more efficient farmer who can
make the farm profitable even under the new circumstances.5
4 The expected marginal abatement cost is shown in the appendix as the left-hand side of (Al) and  (A8). The marginal
utility of abatement is defined as Q' in the appendix.  For a more rigorous discussion  of this problem, see Holmstrom.  (See
also "Implications" section here for a discussion of feasible contract designs.)
5 If an additional restriction  were imposed requiring-that all farmers should stay in business, i.e., a  participation con-
straint,  the  cost  of  achieving  the  abatement  would be  likely to  increase.  It is  also  questionable  whether the  idea  of
nonindividual contracts holds under these circumstances. Note also we assume here that there are no economies of scale, and
that farmers  have no  market  power. Both  of these  assumptions limit the  possibilities  for strategic behavior.  Although
alternative  assumptions  may  affect  the  performance  of the  incentive  scheme,  this  analysis  does  not  evaluate  model
performance when relaxing these assumptions.
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An Illustration
To illustrate the characteristics of the incentive scheme proposed in this study, we take
a simple  example by comparing the incentive  scheme to a tax regime and to a cost-
effective reduction of pollution. Consider a drainage basin with two farms. Both farmers
have  identical  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions  of homogeneity  less than  unity.
However,  because  of  differences  in  soil  quality,  crops,  location,  and  management
practices, the two farms have different runoff of pollution from their land. Assume also
that differences in runoff are reflected  in the probability function for detection.  This
means that the effects  on probability  are different  depending  on the farm at which
pollution  abatement  measures  are  taken.  If the  problem  of nitrogen  emissions  is
considered, we can define the following expressions for emissions  and the probability
function:
(5)  E(e) = 0.3NA  + 0.7NB,
and
(6)  e; N  A  N  ) de  - 0.3-  + 0.7- fo  Df(e  NA,  N)de  e-eNB) gA  B  I
where e is emissions of nitrogen; NA  and NB are nitrogen use on farm A and farm B,
respectively; and e * is an ambient pollution standard. Variables with an overbar (e, N)
denote initial values of the variables before the incentive  scheme is introduced.
To  continue  our  exercise,  assume  that farmers  produce  crops using  two  inputs:
nitrogen and other inputs, denoted x. Assume further that farmers have different levels
of risk aversion,  such that farmer A  is risk averse,  while farmer B  is risk neutral.
Following previous notation, we can define farmer A's income as:
WHA  = (o(xA)0. 4(NA) 0 2 - WxXA- _  NNA  + kBNA  - kANB
and WLA = WHA - pLA, where <1  is a positive constant. Factor prices are represented by
w, and P is the penalty per hectare of arable land. The terms kANB  and kBNA  are linear
payments between farmers that can be used for buying and selling abatement effort.
Farmer B's income is defined  analogous to A's. We now can define the maximization
problem for farmers A and B:
(7a)  max  [1-  f(e; N,  NB)de](WHA)  +  e*f(e; NA,  NB)de (WLA)a,
xA,NA, NB
(7b)  max  [1-  fef(e; NA, NB) de WHB + fef(e; NA, NB)de WLB,
xB,NA,  NB
and
(7c)  max (I(xi)0.4(Ni) 0'2 - wXXi  - (wN+ t)N i,  i =A,B,
x iNi
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Table 1. Farmers'  Private Profits and Allocation Under Four Different Policy
Scenarios to Reduce Nitrogen Emissions by 50%
NA  NB  xA  XB  Expec. Profit  P  Tax
Policy Scenarios  (kg)  (kg)  (kg)  (kg)  (SEK)  (SEK)  (%)
Cost-Effective  65.8  43.2  2,610  2,268  3,787  0  0
Incentive Scheme  65.8  43.2  2,610  2,268  3,263  1,048  0
Incentive Scheme (no trade)  33.8  59.1  2,560  2,307  2,785  1,970  0
Tax Scheme  50.0  50.0  2,381  2,381  3,174  0  58.7
Notes: These results were generated using the following parameter values:  wx = 2/3, wN = 10, and  1 = 80.
NA denotes nitrogen use by risk-averse farmerA; NB denotes nitrogen use by risk-neutral farmer B; xA and
xB denote other inputs used by farmer A and farmer B, respectively, to produce crops; and P is per hectare
penalty paid by farmers when observed  water quality is below  the ambient standard.  SEK is Swedish
currency units.
where a e [0,  1] measures the concavity of farmer A's utility function, and t is a tax on
nitrogen  use.  Equations  (7a)  and  (7b)  are  the  maximization  problems  under the
incentive  scheme, and  (7c)  is the maximization  problem under the tax  scheme.6 To
illustrate the outcome  of different policies, table  1  shows the allocation and farmers'
profits under four scenarios:
*  A cost-effective reduction of emissions. Here, (7c) is maximized setting t = 0, subject
to (5), and to a pollution constraint that requires total emissions of nitrogen to be less
than an ambient standard, e *.
*  Reduction of emissions under the suggested incentive scheme.  Under this scenario,
(7a) and (7b) are maximized, where P is set such that an ambient standard, e *, is not
violated.
*  Reduction of emissions under the incentive  scheme, but where  no trade is allowed
among farmers.  In this case,  (7a)  and (7b)  are maximized,  while setting the  side
payment, k, to zero for all levels of nitrogen use. This scenario corresponds to a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium where farmers do not trade pollution abatement.
*  Reduction  of nitrogen  emissions  by taxing  the  use of inputs. Here,  (7c)  is  maxi-
mized subject to (5), where t is set to a level  such that the ambient standard is not
violated.
In table 1, we observe that the suggested incentive scheme generates the same alloca-
tion of factors as the cost-effective  reduction  of nitrogen emissions,  as was proposed
earlier. The level of aggregate profits under the tax scheme may seem surprisingly high.
The reason for  this result is that the tax payment  is considered  certain,  and thus
farmers do not allocate resources  according to their risk aversion [compare (7a)-(7c)].
Figure 1 shows the difference in farmers' private profits under the four policy scenarios.
6 Note that the tax scheme includes only a uniform tax on inputs. Differentiated input taxes, properly  specified, could in
this case also achieve the cost-effective  reduction of nitrogen emissions. However,  as has been argued by Shortle and Dunn
(and others), it is rarely the case that the regulatory agency has sufficient information to formulate efficient  differentiated
taxes. We have assumed that the agency does not have sufficient information for detailed regulation of farmers' abatement
efforts.  Therefore, differentiated  taxes are not included  as an alternative in this illustration.  We can also note that our
suggested incentive scheme is equivalent to the system of uniform input taxes as a special case: If not only the profit functions
of farmers are identical, but also the water quality impact, then a uniform input tax would be sufficient to achieve the cost-
effective  allocation of factors.
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Figure 1. Private profits under four different policy scenarios
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The  expected  penalty  payment  and  the  tax  are  solely  transfers  of wealth  that
reallocate resources from farmers to other individuals. The social cost of implementing
a policy is then the reduction in farmers' profits due to reallocation of factor use. Figure
2 shows the social costs of three policies at different nitrogen abatement levels.
It is clear from figure 2 that the social cost of our incentive scheme is lower than the
social  cost  of a tax  policy.  We  also  see  that the  costs  for  a  noncooperative  Nash
equilibrium  solution are considerably  higher than costs under the incentive scheme.
This result implies that a stable cooperative  Nash equilibrium can be achieved under
the incentive scheme.
It  should  be  noted  that costs  and relative  differences  across  policies  are  merely
indicative.  Exact differences  are contingent on the shape of farmers' profit and utility
functions, as well as on each farm's impact on water quality. Nevertheless, this example
demonstrates the arguments made previously.
Implications
In the incentive  scheme that we propose,  there are a few points worth examining in
more detail. We can formulate three questions:  (a) Why would farmers engage in trade
of pollution abatement?  (b) If trade is desirable, how can contracts among farmers be
enforced? and (c) What will be the equilibrium price of the "virtual permits," and how
is this equilibrium reached?
Why Trade Abatement?
The motivation for trade in pollution abatement is simply that farmers' cost functions
of abatement effort are different, and that farmers have different levels of risk aversion.
If farmers can observe  one another's  efforts,  they can buy and sell  pollution  among
themselves  and thus reduce total abatement  costs compared  with a situation where
trade  is not possible. If all farmers  have the same risk aversion, the problem can be
solved without allowing  for trade  simply by introducing  a collective  penalty that is
constructed such that free riding is discouraged.
Solving  the  free-rider  problem,  however,  may  lead  to  an  "overkill"  effect  if the
difference in farmers' costs of effort is large. To solve the free-rider problem, a collective
penalty must be set in such a way that the expected value of the penalty  provides a
private incentive to undertake abatement efforts for each farmer in the watershed. This
requirement may lead to a penalty that forces farmers out of business  and/or it may
result in larger abatement efforts than the socially desirable level. In a dynamic context,
this is a short-run problem-since as marginal costs are equalized among farmers, the
level of penalty can be gradually decreased.
How to Achieve Enforceable Contracts?
The  first  and  strong  assumption  that  enables  enforceability  of  contracts  is  that
farmers can observe  one another's efforts to reduce  pollution.  The realized pollution
level  is  only  observable  ex  post, and  only  on  an aggregate  level.  Contracts  among
farmers  thus  have  to  be  based  on  their  abatement  efforts  rather  than  on  actual
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reductions in pollution from a particular farm. We assume that there exists a common
perception  among farmers  of how much  pollution reduction  can be  expected from  a
certain  abatement  effort.  There  are  (at least)  three  ways  of achieving  enforceable
contracts among farmers, identified  below.
*  Lawsuits. If a farmer does not perform according to the contract, that farmer can be
sued in court for not  fulfilling the terms  of the contract.  This requires  clear and
commonly accepted rules of how and when a contract is fulfilled.
*  Pay on Deliverance. A farmer does not pay for contracted abatement efforts until it
is possible to verify that the agreed effort has been carried out.
* A  Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We  could easily  formulate a strategy in  a
repeated game among farmers where cooperation achieves  a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (e.g., Gibbons).
The first two alternatives for achieving  enforceable  contracts require rather detailed
information,  and therefore may not be very credible for practical policy. The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium represents a third and more general approach that requires
less of formal contracts  by looking at the problem in  a dynamic  context.  This third
alternative means that we can find a strategy in which it is profitable for farmers to
cooperate in the long run.
To illustrate, we can look at a two-stage game with two farmers: farmerA and farmer
B. Assume that farmer A moves first and has higher abatement  costs than farmer B.
Farmer A is therefore interested in buying abatement effort from farmer B if the price
of buying pollution is less than farmer A's own marginal costs of pollution abatement,
and if farmer A knows that farmer B will actually perform the abatement effort that
farmer A pays for (and farmer B knows that farmer A has this information).
Assume now that farmer B receives a payment in period 1 in order to perform abate-
ment in period 2.  If there are no penalties and period 2 is the last stage of the game,
then farmer B's profits would be higher by not complying than by performing abatement
efforts according to the contract with farmer A. This is because there is no third period
in which farmer B can be penalized for not performing the abatement effort.
Let us now instead look at an infinite game between the farmers, and assume that
farmerA adopts the following strategy: If farmer B in any period chooses not to perform
the abatement effort that has been contracted with farmer A, then farmer A will never
engage in trade again. Farmer B's best response in this case is to cooperate. Under this
simple "trigger"  strategy, both farmers' profits will be lower over time if they do not
cooperate since, by assumption, their total profit is higher under cooperation than under
noncooperation.
Although the arguments  presented above  are set in a dynamic  context, while our
model is a static one, they nevertheless show that a cooperative and stable solution can
be achieved quite easily. Moreover,  the intuition behind our problem is not helped by
presenting a dynamic model. The issue here is not to show ways of practical policy, but
simply to point out the possibilities inherent  in an incentive scheme  such as the one
proposed in this study. Therefore a static model, although simple, suffices to demon-
strate the main points we wish to make.
Enforceability  also depends  on the legal  opportunities  that the authority  has  for
enforcing  collective penalties.  Meran  and Schwalbe  offer an interesting note on the
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possibilities for legal enforcement of their suggested collective penalty system: ". ..  our
term 'collective penalty' may be somewhat misleading.  To our knowledge there exists
no criminal law which allows punishment without evidence  of guilt. But precisely this
proof of guilt is ruled out in our model by the assumed informational structure" (p. 628).
This problem  is equally valid in the incentive  scheme we  suggest  here. If collective
penalties cannot be enforced due to the legal structure, the problem could be solved by
reversing the penalty to a contingent subsidy that will serve the same purpose, although
it yields other distributional effects than a penalty system.
The Equilibrium  Price of Permits
Finally, consider the equilibrium price of permits. The actual price of buying abatement
effort from other farmers depends on each farmer's marginal  costs of abatement effort
as well  as on  each farmer's  negotiation  skills: a buying farmer  will buy  at a  price
that is not higher than the marginal costs of abatement effort; a selling farmer will sell
only if compensation is at least as high as the marginal cotionsts of effort. In practice, there
may be a gap in marginal  costs among farmers,  and some  of the farmers may make
profits.  The distribution of profits depends  on the negotiating skills that each farmer
possesses.
Conclusions
In this analysis, we suggest the use of nonindividual contracts, between farmers and a
regulatory agency, to control agricultural NPS pollution.  We show that for a domestic
pollution problem, abatement efficiency can be attained even though contracts are not
individual.  The  proposed  incentive  scheme  generates  a  cost-effective  reduction  of
emissions because  it  allows farmers  to trade  pollution abatement  efforts  among one
another. This requires that farmers be able to observe the abatement efforts of at least
a few  other  farmers.  While  it  can be  argued  that this type  of contracting  requires
farmers to hold extensive information,  we think it is more plausible that farmers hold
some information about one another than to assume that the regulating authority has
sufficient information to formulate individual contracts with farmers. We also note that
individual contracting  may be prohibitively expensive for a regulating authority, and
therefore the incentive scheme proposed in this study has policy implications that may
be substantial.
The suggested incentive scheme rests on collective penalties for farmers. All farmers
have to pay the penalty if water quality is less than an ambient standard. As pointed
out by Meran and Schwalbe,  a system of collective  penalties has weak legal support,
since criminal law generally requires that liability is established on an individual level.
We note that if the  suggested incentive  scheme  with collective penalties  lacks  legal
support, it can be reversed to a scheme based on conditional subsidies, where a subsidy
is paid only if the ambient water  quality  standard is not violated.  Of course,  these
subsidies would then also reverse the distributional effects of the incentive that we have
suggested here.
The incentive system also does not require that farmers "stay in business." If imple-
mentation of the incentive scheme means that some farmers go out of  business, this does
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not affect the mechanism of the suggested system. Farmers may go out of business for
various reasons. Some may be "too" risk averse relative to the other farmers, such that
they undertake a large share of the abatement. Other reasons may be that some farmers
are relatively less efficient in their production, or perhaps financially weaker, than other
farmers in the region. Traditional agricultural policy tends to protect farmers from going
out  of business.  If this  is an  issue,  the  suggested  incentive  scheme  can  easily  be
converted to a system of conditional  subsidies, yielding the same financial incentives
to farmers.
[Received March 1997, final revision received January 1998.]
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Appendix
We intend to show that the incentive  scheme  yields a cost-effective  allocation  of abatement  efforts




i) +  j  kJi(a
i)  -k  j(a J)
foai(e; a)de  faJ(e;  a) de
The interpretation  of (Al) is that, in optimum, a farmer's  expected marginal cost of abatement  is
equal between abatement at the individual farm and buying abatement from other farmers. To complete
the proof, we need to show that given the incentive  scheme, all farmers' marginal costs of abatement
are equal in optimum. In order to simplify notation, let
Q i =  - a)  [Vi(WH i) v i(WLi)]
(-  f*(e; a) de  V(WH
i) + ef(e;a)  deV
i '(WLi)
Text equations  (3) and (4) are then rewritten as:
(A2)  pya(ai) - cai(a')  +  j kji(ai)  =  Qi  fa(e; a)de,  Vi  j,
and
(A3)  -k~/&)  V (A3)  -^kaj(a
i) = Qi  faj  (e;a)de,  V i  j.
Equations (A2) and (A3) hold for all farmers in the watershed. Analogous to equations (A2) and (A3),
the first-order conditions of farmerj are specified as:
(A4)  pyai(a  ja(aJ)  + i  k
i (ai) =  QJi  e*faj(e; a)de,  Vj
and
(A5)  -kk,(al)  = QJ  f efa(e; a)  de,  Vj  i.
The bribe,  k (aJ),  that farmer i makes to farmerj has to be strictly equal to the payment that farmer
j  receives  (given zero transactions costs).  Hence, all marginal bribes must be equated  among farms.
Consequently, farmer i's marginal payment toj, that is, k '(ai)  in (A3), is equal to the bribe that farmer
j  receives from i in (A4). Thus, (A3) is solved for ka (a-)  and the result is substituted into (A4) for all
i  j, which then yields:
(A6)  pyaj(aJ)- ca(aJ) = ffa(e; a)de (Qi +  i Qi),  Vj  i,
where  i = (1, 2,..., j - 1,  j +  1,..., n). Following the arguments above, we also substitute  (A5) into (A2)
for allj  ￿  i:
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(A7)  pyai(ai)  cai(ai)=  feL(e; a)de(Qi +  j  Q),  Vi ij,
where j  = (1, 2,..., i - 1,  i +  1, ..., n). Note that the terms within large parentheses in (A6) and (A7) both
express the sum over all the n farms in the watershed. Dividing (A6) by (A7) and rearranging the terms
then yields the following result:
(A8)  pyaj(ai) -cai(a)  pyai(ai) - ca(ai)
fofaj(e; a) de  ffa,(e; a)de
Equation (A8) shows that under the incentive scheme, the expected marginal costs of abatement are
equal  among farms. By (Al) and (A8), it is clear that a cost-effective reduction ofnonpoint  emissions
is achieved under the incentive  scheme.